

"First-Strike" Nuclear Warfare

The notion that "a good offense makes the best defense" is driving the United States and the Soviet Union into a dangerous new phase of the nuclear arms race. Both superpowers are building weapons that make nuclear war more likely and revising their war plans accordingly.

Both sides are building long and medium range "first-strike" weapons which could tempt the owners, or frighten the adversary, into launching first in a crisis. At the very least, these weapons would guarantee rapid escalation once a war starts. Both sides are also building short range "first-use" weapons that could turn a conventional war into a nuclear nightmare. Perhaps in recognition of the suicidal nature of full-scale nuclear war, implausible "limited" nuclear war doctrines are being devised to justify these new weapons.

The situation is new in two important respects. First, highly accurate, short flight-time missiles are dramatically increasing the likelihood of hasty decisions made in panic. Second, the threat of a preemptive first-strike attack is becoming a mutual threat for the first time. One thing that is **not** new is the capability, and implied intention, on the part of the United States to wage first-strike warfare.

For 25 years prior to 1970, superior Soviet ground armies were counter-balanced by three factors, according to former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger:

"First, by the American preponderance in strategic nuclear striking power, **capable of disarming the Soviet Union** or at least reducing its counterblow to tolerable levels while still retaining large residual forces for attacks on industrial targets;

"Second, by a vast American superiority in so-called theater nuclear forces;


"And third, in Europe, by substantial American and allied ground forces that posed at least a major probability that Soviet ground attack would trigger the **nuclear** retaliation of the United States." [Emphasis added.]

In other words, American policy

was intended to deter Soviet military expansion by threatening a massive nuclear first-strike attack, following which, a Soviet retaliation would be impossible, or at least its effects would be "tolerable." In 1960, the casualties from a nuclear war were expected to number in the hundreds of millions, with virtually none of those casualties occurring in the United States. Recently declassified documents show that during the 1950s the United States had a strategic plan to reduce the Soviet Union to a "smoking, radiating ruin at the end of two hours," due to a single massive attack by American bombers. General Curtis LeMay, then com-

bomber fleet was insignificant. This situation was destined to change in the 1960s with the introduction of Soviet missiles capable of delivering H-bombs on the United States. However, early Soviet missiles could not be launched quickly. American bombers probably could have destroyed them on the launch pad while cumbersome liquid fuel was being pumped into the missiles' fuel tanks.

In 1965, the first instantly-launchable, pre-fueled missiles were deployed in Soviet underground silos, thus assuring the Soviet ability to retaliate. Many analysts would agree with Kissinger, however, that it was not until approximately 1970, that the



Mutual First Strike

In this illustration two nations, Frontierland and Fantasyland, are *each* armed with 10 MX-type missiles. Each missile has 10 highly accurate warheads. By launching *first* Frontierland can disarm and destroy Fantasyland; but Fantasyland could have done the same thing to Frontierland if *it* had launched first. The situation is inherently unstable, even though the forces are equal. Illustration adapted from *Scientific American*, November, 1979, p. 53.

mander of the Air Force Strategic Air Command, stated in a secret 1954 briefing, "I believe that if the United States is pushed in the corner far enough we would not hesitate to strike first."

Such a plan was possible *only* because the Soviet nuclear arsenal was small and the Soviet long-range

mutually assured destruction first described in 1966 by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, became truly mutual. In any case, after 1970 **both** superpowers would have been smoking, radiating ruins following a nuclear war, regardless of which side struck first. **Nothing in the foreseeable future is likely to alter this fact.**

At that point, it might have been wise for both sides to abandon any notion of nuclear superiority and to accept the idea that nuclear war would mean mutual suicide. It should have been obvious that the threat of nuclear war could no longer be used as an instrument of policy—except possibly for the purpose of deterring nuclear war itself. Indeed, there was much talk, at the time, of mutual deterrence, of nuclear “sufficiency” rather than superiority, and of “de-tente” rather than confrontation. The first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) was signed in 1972. Arms control became an announced priority of both governments, but the arms race did not stop.

easily deliverable warheads, and the assured ability to retaliate after absorbing a massive first strike.

Contrary to popular belief, missiles cannot be intercepted or shot down after they have been launched. They must be attacked **before** they are launched. It is theoretically possible, but unproven, that new highly accurate missiles can destroy enemy missiles in their silos and submarines during a first strike. (There is considerable doubt that missiles can ever be as accurate as their makers claim, but the entire nuclear modernization program now underway is based on the assumption that they will be.)

attack), for fear that the other side might see it coming. The real danger is that first-strike weapons reduce the time available to properly evaluate an attack warning and to make an intelligent response. The weapons will tend to make both sides trigger-happy. There have been three well-publicized false alarms of Soviet attack in recent years. Senator Mark Hatfield (R-Oregon) says that false alarms of Soviet attack occur several times every month.

“Within a month [in 1969] I had met the first of a small but not uninfluential community of people who violently opposed SALT for a simple reason: It might keep America from developing a first-strike capability against the Soviet Union. I’ll never forget being lectured by an Air Force colonel about how we should have ‘nuked’ the Soviets in the late 1940s before they got The Bomb. I was told that if SALT would go away, we’d soon have the capability to nuke them again—and this time we’d use it.”

—Roger Molander, former nuclear strategist for the White House’s National Security Council, *Washington Post*, March 21, 1982, p. D5.

Nine Billion Dollars for New First-Strike Weapons in the 1983 Pentagon Budget Request

For Attacking Land-based Targets

Item	Cost in Millions		
	Quantity	Procurement	Research
MX Missiles	9	\$1,497.1	\$2,759.3
Pershing II Missiles	91	508.6	111.3
Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles	120	519.9	78.6
Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles	120	308.4	405.3
Trident II (D-5) Missile	—	—	366.7

For Attacking Missile Submarines at Sea

Item	Quantity	Procurement	Research
Attack Submarines	2	1,732.4	3.0
P-3 Orion Aircraft	6	341.8	21.6
Anti-Submarine Torpedoes & Mines	1060	418.1	303.4
Total (dollar figure in millions)		\$5,326.3	\$4,049.2

Source: *Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon System: DoD Budget for FY 1983* (8 February 1982).

The present nuclear arms crisis is posed, in part, by a futile American attempt to recover something of the “preponderance in strategic nuclear striking power” which was once America’s by default. The essence of that vanished preponderance was the ability to strike first without suffering retaliation. A first strike in the 1980s, however, is quite different from a first strike in the early age of missiles and nuclear bombers. Today, both sides have a wide variety of nuclear-armed missiles which can be launched on short notice from underground concrete silos, underwater submarines, and airborne planes. Each side has thousands of

A nuclear fireball from an accurately delivered warhead can dig an unlaunched missile out of the ground and toss its pulverized remains into the stratosphere. Bomber bases can be destroyed while the airplanes are still on the ground. Missile submarines can be sunk before they launch their missiles. In order to be successful, the attacker must attack first, but any first-strike attack today can always be thwarted if the nation under attack launches its retaliation before the incoming weapons arrive.

The risks are so high that no sane Soviet or American leader would ever attempt a “bolt out of the blue” attack (known in the trade as a BOOB

By its very nature, an attack on a missile before it is launched punishes the restraint its owner exercised by leaving it in the silo or the submarine instead of launching it. It should be obvious, that to punish restraint does not enhance deterrence. If any side has a sufficient number of first-strike weapons, the other side cannot afford to wait—or even to hold anything in reserve—once it thinks the war has started.

“As the capabilities of weapons improve,” former arms negotiator Gerald C. Smith told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1981, “each side will feel stronger incentives to shoot first in a crisis, if it believes for any reason that the other side may be contemplating a pre-emptive strike of its own. The logic of ‘use-them-or-lose-them’ could create unbearable pressures on national leaders.”

Among the US weapons systems designed to place Soviet weapons in a use-them-or-lose-them situation are: the highly accurate Mark 12A warhead on the latest Minuteman III missile; the forthcoming MX, Trident II, Pershing II, and cruise missiles (especially the submarine-launched

cruise missile (SLCM), and the patrol planes, attack submarines, and listening devices of the Navy's extensive and effective anti-submarine warfare program. Heavy Soviet missiles pose the same threat to US land-based weapons systems. However, there is no significant Soviet threat to US submarines, a fact that might seem comforting except that the US lead in anti-submarine warfare could heighten Soviet fears of an American attack.

Although the idea is difficult for military traditionalists to accept, it makes no sense at all for one nation to counter a first-strike threat to itself by mounting one of its own. The United States cannot protect its own weapons by threatening Soviet weapons, unless the United States actually launches a completely successful first strike.

Common sense will prevent these new weapons systems from ever being justified to the Congress on the basis of massive first-strike plans like those of the 1950s. Today's justifications must be more convoluted and confusing. In the classified Presidential Directive 59, the Carter Administration attempted to justify the new weapons on the basis of "limited" first-strike plans which are so implausible, from what is known of them, that the Reagan Administration should be embarrassed to repeat the arguments. After all, **limited** strategic warfare is incompatible with use-them-or-lose-them. In defending PD 59 and the hardware it calls for, the Carter Administration bragged that the MX missile would increase "US damage capability against Soviet silos in a counter-silo retaliation." This prospect denies the fact that the mere existence of the MX will serve to insure that once a war starts no Soviet missiles will be left in their silos for the MX to retaliate against.

An example of the lunatic reasoning of the Carter Administration is the "window of vulnerability" theory which stated that during the 1980's the Soviet Union would enjoy a first-strike advantage over the United States. The theory was *not* that the Soviets could launch a first strike and avoid retaliation, as the US could have done in the 1950's, but only that they could destroy more US warheads in a limited first strike than they would expend in the attack. The

FIRST STRIKE SCORE SHEET for 1982

United States Weapons vs. Soviet Targets

Hard Target Capable Weapons

Hard Targets

Present:

900 Mark 12A warheads on 300 Minuteman III missiles in silos

Future:

150 additional Mark 12A warheads on 50 Minuteman III missiles in silos
1000 ABRV warheads on 100 MX missiles
464 warheads on 464 Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) in Europe
108 warheads on 108 Pershing II missiles in Europe
—?— warheads on Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs) on attack submarines
—?— warheads on Trident II (D5) missiles on ballistic missile submarines

vs. 1398 ballistic missile silos

Soft Target Capable Weapons

Soft Targets

750 Mark 12 warheads on 250 Minuteman III missiles in silos
450 warheads on 450 Minuteman II missiles in silos
52 warheads on 52 Titan II missiles in silos
1728 warheads on 216 Trident I (C4) missiles on 13 ballistic missile submarines
3054 warheads on 304 Poseidon (C3) missiles on 19 ballistic missile submarines

vs. 2 Submarine bases (with 57 ballistic missile submarines normally in port)
All Soviet military airfields

Anti-Submarine Capable Weapons

Ballistic Missile Submarines at Sea

30 attack submarines normally at sea (33% of the total fleet)
230 P3 Orion Aircraft

vs. 10 ballistic missile submarines normally at sea (15% of the total fleet); the US Navy probably knows the location of most Soviet submarines at sea

Soviet Weapons vs. United States Targets

Hard Target Capable Weapons

Hard Targets

Present:*

2500 warheads on 308 SS-18 missiles in silos
1800 warheads on 300 SS-19 missiles in silos

vs. 1052 ballistic missile silos

Future:

—?— warheads on a new generation of ballistic missiles

Soft Target Capable Weapons

Soft Targets

600 warheads on 150 SS-17 missiles in silos
60 warheads on 60 SS-13 missiles in silos
580 warheads on 580 SS-11 missiles in silos
448 warheads on 448 SS-N-6 missiles on 28 ballistic missile submarines
295 warheads on 295 SS-N-8 missiles on 25 ballistic missile submarines
16 warheads on 16 SS-N-17 missiles on one ballistic missile submarine
576 warheads on 192 SS-N-18 missiles on 12 ballistic missile submarines
120 warheads on 20 SS-N-20 missiles on one ballistic missile submarine

vs. 4 submarine bases (with 16 ballistic missile submarines normally in port)
12 12 aircraft carriers
All US and NATO military airfields

Anti-Submarine Capable Weapons

Ballistic Missile Submarines at Sea

22 attack submarines normally at sea (20% of the total fleet)
30 Bear F Aircraft

vs. 16 ballistic missile submarines normally at sea (50% of the total fleet); the Soviet Navy probably does *not* know the location of US submarines at sea

*Claims of hard target kill capability for Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 missiles are highly controversial. Some analysts say that because of low accuracy, several such warheads would have to be exploded on each target to achieve a high probability of destroying the target.

Sources: Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, Center for Defense Information, Federation of American Scientists, and Robert Aldridge, *The Counterforce Syndrome*, Institute for Policy Studies, 1979.

This chart shows the fallacy of comparing missiles with missiles and warheads with warheads. The proper comparison is between warheads on one side and targets on the other, and vice versa, except in the special case of ballistic missile submarines, which must be located before they can be destroyed. Notice that both sides can be ahead simultaneously in the first-strike arms race, but only the side that starts the war will be able to cash in on its advantage. To do so, of course, would be suicidal.

Neither side now has a first-strike capability; both sides could retaliate with overwhelming destructive effect, even after suffering a surprise attack. Further arms escalation by either side increases pressures on both sides to start a nuclear war, because it places enemy retaliatory weapons in a use-them-first-or-lose-them situation. Even if one side became vastly superior, the weaker side could always start a war to avoid being disarmed, or launch its retaliation "on warning" before the incoming enemy missiles arrived.


One percent of the warheads in either arsenal could kill half the urban population of the other side.

premise is doubtful, and the implication is fundamentally dishonest.

Even after a Soviet first strike that was nearly perfect in its execution, one that took the United States completely by surprise and destroyed every submarine in port, every bomber not on alert, and 90% of the missile silos—itsself a very unlikely scenario—the United States would still have hundreds of surviving missiles and dozens of surviving bombers with *thousands* of deliverable warheads and bombs. The US Navy normally has 16 missile submarines at sea, any one of which could destroy the Soviet Union as an industrial society and kill its urban population. (With any warning at all, hundreds of bombers could become safely airborne, an additional 16 missile submarines could be put to sea, and, of course, the land-based missiles could be launched.) Since five to 20 million Americans would be killed in the attack, a Soviet leader who assumed that the United States would not retaliate would be too



Each of America's 88 attack submarines is a first-strike weapon system designed to destroy a Soviet ballistic missile submarine before it can launch its missiles. With new Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs) an attack submarine will be able to destroy land-based targets as well, quadrupling overnight the number of US submarines that can threaten targets on land.



In 1957 America's fleet of 1800 B-47 bombers, each armed with one high-yield H-bomb, was a far more potent first-strike force than the MX missile could ever be. Reason: At the time the Soviet Union had virtually no retaliatory capability.


irrational to be deterred by anything. To describe such a situation as "vulnerability" is to practice deliberate deception, except in the sense that every country is now vulnerable to nuclear destruction and always will be.

This imaginary window was scheduled to be closed in the 1990s when the 4400 empty decoy shelters of the MX missile in Utah and Nevada would raise the cost of a Soviet first strike. The Soviets would once again have to expend more warheads than they destroyed, using at least 4600

warheads to destroy the 2000 MX warheads on 200 missiles. The plan would have designated the Great Basin area as a sponge for incoming Soviet warheads, an idea the local citizens found objectionable. There were many other obvious defects in the plan.

Popular opposition forced the Reagan Administration to abandon the multiple shelter basing mode and to search for another window of vulnerability theory which would justify building the MX missile anyway. A desire to build the missile

US STRATEGIC FORCE SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCE



- 1/ TOTAL SLBM TUBES ON ACTIVE SUBMARINES
- 2/ TOTAL NUMBER OF BEAR AND BISON BOMBERS
- 3/ CUMULATIVE TOTALS OF SS-7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 17, 18 AND 19


- 1/ NUMBER OF TUBES ON US POLARIS AND POSEIDON SSBN. INCLUDED IN THIS CATEGORY ARE THE SLBM DEDICATED TO SACEUR
- 2/ NUMBER OF ATLAS, TITAN AND MINUTEMAN MISSILES
- 3/ NUMBER OF B-47 AND B-52 BOMBERS, EXCLUDING B-47's BASED IN EUROPE

No Longer Number One

The overwhelming American superiority in strategic nuclear weapons from 1945 until about 1970 is evident in this Department of Defense graph. The US lost its first-strike capability as the Soviet arsenal grew in the late 1960s. Superiority is now impossible for either side.

AVCO
ADVANCED BALLISTIC REENTRY VEHICLE
(OPERATIONAL PROTOTYPE)

BASE DIAMETER	21.8 INCHES
NOSE RADIUS	1.40 INCHES
OVERALL LENGTH	66.9 INCHES
HALF ANGLE	8.2 DEGREES



The New Warhead for the MX and Trident II Missile Systems

The essence of first-strike warfare is the use of an H-bomb the size of a trash can to make an explosion large enough to level a city in order to destroy another H-bomb the size of a trash can.

is the only truly consistent theme in government arguments about the MX. Barring the discovery of a sufficiently credible window of vulnerability, a window of credulity in the American psyche may have to suffice.

Richard N. Perle, Reagan's Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, is content to praise the "prompt hard target kill capability" of the new weapons. He asserts, without explanation, that they increase the "strategic utility" of the deterrent force. If every new weapon requested for the strategic "modernization" program is actually built and deployed, it would not be illogical for the Soviets to fear that "strategic utility" is another euphemism for a preemptive, unanswerable first strike.

If all-out war is suicidal, and limited strategic war is implausible, there is still a possibility of **geographically** limited nuclear war. President Reagan created a political storm in Europe with his October 16, 1981, statement: "I could see where you could have the exchange of tactical weapons against troops in the field without it bringing either one of the major powers to pushing the button." What made Reagan's statement particularly frightening to Europeans was his recent approval of the neutron bomb, an anti-tank nuclear weapon with the explosive power of one thousand tons of TNT. As a US nuclear weapon designed for use

against Soviet conventional forces, the neutron bomb's existence implies a US plan to make a non-nuclear war go nuclear. It is a first-use weapon. In the age of mutually assured destruction plus use-them-or-lose-them, any plan to start a nuclear war is risky, to say the least. Even if the war did remain limited, it could still destroy Europe.

Another concern of the Europeans is that the US Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles slated for deployment on European soil have sufficient accuracy, explosive power, and range to be used as first-strike weapons against the Soviet Union. That fact makes their deployment sites in Europe potential first-strike targets for the Soviets.

If a "limited" nuclear war were to start, either in Europe or between the superpowers directly, one side or the other would soon feel it was losing. With enormous forces in reserve, the temporary loser would escalate—and cause its adversary to follow suit. Soon, both sides would be permanent losers.

It is imperative for us to realize that the nuclear arsenal modernization program started by the Carter Administration and enthusiastically pursued by the Reagan Administration **increases** the threat of nuclear war, regardless of how the Soviets respond. The limited war doctrines which justify the new weapons are little more than fantasies invented for

the purpose of denying the otherwise evident fact that nuclear weapons are not useable. The mutual ability to retaliate may have some short-term utility in inhibiting nuclear war. However, in all likelihood the actual use of nuclear weapons for any reason, under any circumstances, will be the final act of impotent rage by a dead or dying nation.

For that reason, a reversal of the nuclear arms race, leading to the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons, must be the primary long-term goal of all national security activity. No system of threats and counter-threats can possibly be stable enough or last long enough to be a permanent solution to the problem of nuclear war. **Mutual assured destruction is a fact, not a policy.** Just as there is no possibility of winning a nuclear war, there is no longer any meaningful way to be ahead in the arms race. "Prompt hard target kill capability" does not confer an advantage on either side; it merely makes the balance of terror more dangerous.

If the way to get meaningful arms control agreements is to frighten the Soviets with overwhelming force, the arms race would have ended twenty years ago. Soviet response to American nuclear superiority in the 1950's was to imitate the US arsenal. The first-strike force now on order by the Pentagon will also be imitated, leading both sides into a trap which appears to offer an advantage to the side that starts the next war, but which offers survival to neither. Enough is enough, and the time to stop is now.

A rapidly growing movement in America is calling for a halt to the nuclear arms race before these new weapons are built. A comprehensive ban on explosive testing of nuclear warheads has been negotiated for several years. Public pressure could force its ratification. Physicians are calling nuclear war the final epidemic, preventable but not treatable. Hundreds of thousands of European demonstrators are demanding a nuclear-free Europe. Concerned people all over the world are looking thirty years into the future and seeing a thermonuclear holocaust—unless we work together to change our present course.

Notable Quotes

First Strike

"This poses a terrible problem, because we at that point, particularly with the MX, would have a clear first-strike capability against their ICBMs, which would be devastating to them. They have to consider a US first strike whether we think we would do that or not."

—General Lew Allen, US Air Force Chief of Staff, US Senate Appropriations Committee Hearing, May 6, 1981.

"On balance the Soviet Union does have a definite margin of superiority—enough so that there is risk and there is what I have called, as you all know several times, a window of vulnerability . . . the Soviet's great edge is one in which they could absorb our retaliatory blow and hit us again."

—President Ronald Reagan, March 31 Press Conference, from *The New York Times*, April 1, 1982, p. A22.

Question: In a nuclear war are we committed not to make the first strike? William Dyess (Assistant Secretary of State for Public Information): No sir.

Question: We could conceivably make an offensive . . .

Dyess: *We make no comment on that whatsoever, but the Soviets know that this terrible weapon has been dropped on human beings twice in history and it was an American president who dropped it both times. Therefore, they have to take this into consideration in their calculus.*

—Newsmakers Interview, NBC Television, February 3, 1980.

Robert Scheer: Don't you reach a point with these strategic weapons where you can wipe each other out so many times and no one wants to use them or be willing to use them, that it really doesn't matter whether you're 10% or 2% lower or higher?

George Bush: *Yes, if you believe there is no such thing as a winner in a nuclear exchange, that argument makes a little sense. I don't believe that.*

Scheer: How do you win in a nuclear exchange?

Bush: *You have a survivability of command in control, survivability of industrial potential, protection of a percentage of your opposition that it can inflict upon you. That's the way you can have a winner, and the Soviets' planning is based on the ugly concept of a winner in a nuclear exchange.*

Scheer: Do you mean like 5% would survive?

Bush: *More than that—if everybody fired everything we had, you'd have more than that survive.*

—Interview, *Los Angeles Times*, January 23, 1980

"The United States could have first-strike capabilities with the development of an advanced Trident submarine missile planned for deployment by 1989, says a defense official.... Under Secretary of Defense for Engineering Dr. Richard DeLauer said the D-5 [Trident II missile] would give the United States 'pre-emptive capability.' The missile would have the 'yield and accuracy to go after very hard targets' such as missile silos, which are heavily protected, he said."

—Associated Press, *Athol (Mass.) Daily News*, October 14, 1981.

"Whereas American missile-carrying submarines at sea are generally thought to be invulnerable to large-scale pre-emptive attack, Russian sea-based forces do not enjoy the same degree of perceived invulnerability. In other words, the American antisubmarine warfare program threatens the existence of deployed Russian missile-carrying submarines."

—Joel S. Wit, "Advances in Antisubmarine Warfare," *Scientific American* (February, 1981), pp. 35-36.

"From a security point of view we would be in a more dangerous position if both countries had systems which could threaten the other's ICBMs than if the Soviets alone had them. Having a missile which can threaten a major part of the Soviet deterrent is only asking the Soviets to launch a preemptive strike or put its missiles on launch on warning."

—Herbert Scoville, Jr., former CIA Deputy Director for Research, from "Testimony on the Strategic and Tactical Assumption of the Military Budget," US House of Representatives, March 8, 1982, p. 4.

Notes on the Text

Terminology—"First strike" is used here to mean any attack by one superpower on the land or sea based nuclear weapon facilities of the other. A first-strike attack may be limited or total depending on how many weapons are involved. Although it is unlikely, a protracted, slowly escalating war might entail repeated first-strike attacks by both sides, the important point being that in each case the attacking weapons must arrive at their targets and explode before the weapons under attack have been launched. "First use" is used in the narrow sense of first use in a geographically limited battlefield.

Kissinger quote—*The SALT II Treaty*: Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Part 3 (July 31, 1979), p. 153.

"smoking, radiating ruin . . ."—Memorandum Op-36C/jm, March 18, 1954, declassified and printed as Document One to David Alan Rosenberg, "A Smoking, Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours," *International Security*, Winter 1981/82, p. 25.

LeMay quote—*ibid.*, p. 27.

Smith quote—*Strategic Weapons Proposals*, Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Part 2 (November 13, 1981), p. 13.

"US damage capability against Soviet silos . . ."—*Nuclear War Strategy*, Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Administration's Responses to Questions Submitted for the Record (September 16, 1980), p. 36.

"prompt hard target kill capability"—Richard N. Perle, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee (February 23, 1982), p. 8.

Reagan quote—October 16, 1981, in the Oval Office, printed in the *Washington Post* (for the first time) in "Reagan Causes Furor in Europe with Remark on Nuclear War," October 21, 1981, p. 1.

"Nuclear superiority is unattainable."

—Paul Warnke, former chief SALT II negotiator, *Chicago Sun Times*, October 22, 1980.

First Use

"United States policy under seven presidents has never renounced the first use of nuclear weapons."

—Melvin Price, Chairman of the US House Armed Services Committee. From Report No. 96-947, May 13, 1980.

"Europe's reluctance to have medium-range missiles on its soil results more than anything else from a growing suspicion—reinforced by careless White House utterances—that the Reagan Administration regards those missiles not as instruments of deterrence but as instruments of war."

—George W. Ball, former Undersecretary of State 1961-66, *Washington Post*, Op-Ed., January 25, 1982.

"The fact is that it is inconceivable that a nuclear war could take place in Europe that would not involve the strategic forces of both the United States and the Soviet Union."

—Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, *The New York Times*, November 22, 1981.

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